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ABSTRACT
The popular view of the inherent conflict between science and the occult has 
been rendered obsolete by recent advances in the history of science. Yet, these 
historiographical revisions have gone unnoticed in the public understanding of 
science and public education at large. Particularly, reconstructions of the formation 
of modern psychology and its links to psychical research can show that the 
standard view of the latter as motivated by metaphysical bias fails to stand up 
to scrutiny. After highlighting certain basic methodological maxims shared by 
psychotherapists and historians, I will try to counterbalance simplistic claims of a 
‘need to believe’ as a precondition of scientific open-mindedness regarding the 
occurrence of parapsychological phenomena by discussing instances revealing 
a presumably widespread ‘will to disbelieve’ in the occult. I shall argue that 
generalized psychological explanations are only helpful in our understanding of 
history if we apply them in a symmetrical manner.
Angst vor der Dunkelheit? Anmerkungen zur Psychologie des 
Glaubens in der Geschichte der Wissenschaft und des Okkulten
Infolge der neuesten Fortschritte innerhalb der Wissenschaftsgeschichte gilt 
der bis dato gängige Blick auf den inhärenten Konflikt zwischen Wissenschaft 
und dem Okkulten als hinfällig. Diese Neuerungen innerhalb der Wissenschaft 
wurden jedoch von der Öffentlichkeit nicht wahrgenommen. Insbesondere die 
Rekonstruktion der Genese der modernen Psychologie und ihren Verbindungen 
zu parapsychologischen Forschungen zeigen, dass sich letztere nicht einfach 
als Ausdruck von metaphysischer Voreingenommenheit verstehen lassen. Um 
nun einen Ausgleich zu schaffen, werde ich Fälle eines, ‘Willens zum Unglauben‘ 
diskutieren und davon ausgehend den Vorschlag machen, dass allgemeine 
psychologische Erklärungen nur dann hilfreich für ein Geschichtsverständnis sind, 
wenn wir sie in einer symmetrischen Art und Weise anwenden.
© 2016 the author(s). published by taylor & francis.
this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited.
CONTACT andreas sommer  as2399@cam.ac.uk
*in memory of John forrester (1949–2015).
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 C
am
br
idg
e] 
at 
03
:09
 22
 A
ug
us
t 2
01
7 
106  A. SOmmER
Tiene usted miedo a la oscuridad? Notas en la psicología de las 
creencias en historias acerca de la ciencia y lo oculto
La visión popular del conflicto inherente entre la ciencia y lo oculto, ha quedado 
obsoleta debido a los avances recientes en la historia de la ciencia. Sin embargo, 
estas revisiones historiográficas han pasado casi desapercibidas en la comprensión 
pública de la ciencia y la educación. Particularmente las reconstrucciones de 
la formación de la psicología moderna y sus conexiones con la investigación 
psíquica, nos muestran que la visión común de esta última, motivada por sesgos 
metafísicos no pasa la prueba de la realidad. En este artículo discuto ejemplos de 
una ‘’voluntad de incredulidad’’ para contrabalancear las demandas simplistas 
de una ‘’necesidad de creer’’ como precondición de una apertura científica de la 
mente en relación con la incidencia de fenómenos parapsicológicos, y sugiero 
que las explicaciones psicológicas generalizadas son útiles solamente en nuestra 
comprensión de la historia si las aplicamos de manera simétrica.
Hai paura del buio? Note sulla psicologia delle credenze nella 
storia della scienza e dell'occulto
La rappresentazione popolare della contrapposizione tra scienza e occulto è 
stata resa obsoleta dai recenti progressi della storia della scienza. Eppure, queste 
revisioni storiografiche sono state trascurate dalla conoscenza comune sulla 
scienza e dall'istruzione pubblica in generale. In particolare la ricostruzione di 
come si sia formata la psicologia moderna e dei suoi collegamenti con la ricerca 
psicologica dimostra una visione standardizzata di questi ultimi, giustificata da 
pregiudizi metafisici che non reggono la verifica. Per controbilanciare affermazioni 
semplicistiche relative a un 'bisogno di credere' come precondizione di una 
scientifica apertura mentale relativa all'insorgenza di fenomeni parapsicologici, 
discuto le istanze della 'volontà di credere' e suggeriscono che le spiegazioni 
psicologiche generiche sono utili alla nostra comprensione della storia solamente 
se le usiamo in modo bilanciato.
Avez-vous peur du noir ? Notes sur la psychologie de la croy-
ance dans l’histoire de la science et l’histoire de l’occulte
L’opinion populaire concernant le conflit intrinsèque entre la science et l’occulte a 
été rendue obsolète par les récentes avancées de l’histoire des sciences. Pourtant 
ces révisions historiographiques sont passées inaperçues de la compréhension 
publique de la science et de l’éducation publique dans son ensemble. Les 
reconstructions de l’évolution de la psychologie moderne et de ses liens avec la 
recherche psychique peuvent montrer en particulier que la vision standard de 
cette dernière en tant que motivée par un bais métaphysique échoue à résister 
à son examen. Pour contrebalancer l’argument simpliste d’un ‘besoin de croire’ 
comme précondition à l’ouverture d’esprit scientifique concernant l’occurrence 
des phénomènes parapsychologiques, des exemples sont ici discutés de ‘volonté 
de ne pas croire’ et il est suggéré que des explications psychologiques généralisées 
sont seulement utiles pour nous aider à comprendre l’histoire à condition de les 
appliquer de manière symétrique.
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‘Ways of being in the world’ in historical research and the 
therapeutic setting
At first glance, psychotherapists and historians appear to have very little in 
common. To be sure, both professions are concerned with human beings, but 
your clients are obviously alive, while my historical protagonists are long gone. 
The persons you work with usually seek you out to get help understanding and 
changing their individual present, whereas I select my historical actors in the 
hope they might prove useful to me as a lens to understand collective pasts. You 
empower your clients to become active collaborators in the therapeutic process 
by encouraging them to mobilize own resources, while my historical actors 
are perfectly at my mercy should I chose to distort their lives to make them fit 
any preconceived narratives of mine. Not least, your clients are protected by 
Φοβάσαι το σκοτάδι; Σημειώσεις σχετικά με την ψυχολογία της 
πίστης στην ιστορία της επιστήμης και του μεταφυσικού
Η δημοφιλής άποψη της εγγενούς σύγκρουσης μεταξύ της επιστήμης και του 
μεταφυσικού έχει καταστεί παρωχημένη από τις πρόσφατες εξελίξεις στην 
ιστορία της επιστήμης. Ωστόσο, αυτές οι ιστοριογραφικές αναθεωρήσεις έχουν 
περάσει απαρατήρητες στη δημόσια κατανόηση της επιστήμης και της δημόσιας 
εκπαίδευσης γενικότερα. Οι ιδιαίτερες ανακατασκευές της διαμόρφωσης της 
σύγχρονης ψυχολογίας και η σύνδεσή της με την ψυχική έρευνα μπορούν 
να καταδείξουν ότι η κανονική οπτική της τελευταίας ως κινούμενης από την 
μεταφυσική προκατάληψη αποτυγχάνει να αντέξει τον λεπτομερή έλεγχο. 
Προκειμένου να αντισταθμίσω απλοϊκές αξιώσεις μιας «ανάγκης να πιστέψουμε» 
ως προϋπόθεση της επιστημονικής ευρύτητας του πνεύματος όσον αφορά την 
εμφάνιση των παραψυχολογικών φαινομένων, θα συζητήσω τις περιπτώσεις 
της «θέλησης να δυσπιστήσουμε» και δείχνω ότι οι γενικευμένες ψυχολογικές 
εξηγήσεις είναι χρήσιμες μόνο στην κατανόηση της ιστορίας αν εφαρμόζονται 
με συμμετρικό τρόπο.
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basic human rights and can take legal steps if they feel mistreated, whereas I 
have nothing to fear in consequence of, say, retroactively tainting a historical 
protagonist’s reputation as the dead are unable to sue.
Yet, it seems that in a crucial sense some of these differences actually indicate 
a mutual work ethos. I take it for granted that the first step in establishing a 
fruitful client-therapist relationship requires the therapist’s commitment to treat 
those seeking help on their own terms. Rather than forcing your own way of 
being in the world upon persons in your care, you will strive to base therapeu-
tic interventions on a thorough understanding of where each is coming from. 
Ideally, historians are trained to observe very similar methodological maxims. 
For our job is no longer to justify the present by limiting reconstructions of the 
past through compatibilities with today’s epistemological and metaphysical 
standards, but to faithfully resurrect the past by doing our best to obtain a 
thorough understanding of sentiments and existential categories that were 
actually at the disposal of the individuals whose ways of being in the world we 
aim to investigate.
Quite often, I struggle to get my head around beliefs and sentiments of my 
historical actors, even if I know this doesn’t necessarily require me to drastically 
modify my own presuppositions and cultural conditionings. I expect similar 
issues to arise as challenges to therapeutic practice. A client may, for instance, 
report a certain class of recurring ‘weird’ experiences, such as fulfilled prophetic 
dreams of accidents and deaths, possibly intrusive telepathic rapport with a par-
ent or lover they are in the process of separating from, frightening out-of-body 
experiences, visual or auditory hallucinations of dead relatives and friends, or 
dramatic ‘poltergeist’-style episodes involving loud noises, levitating objects, 
and other ‘things that go bump’ in their homes or maybe even workplaces. In 
many cases, you may find it advisable not to encourage your client’s belief in 
the reality of the reported phenomena, while trying to establish what emotional 
conflicts and issues each experience may represent.
On the other hand, you might have encountered instances where ostensibly 
‘paranormal’ experiences, rather than being inherently unsettling, on the con-
trary inspired a client’s confidence in higher and ultimately benevolent realities. 
Far from persuading such clients to abandon these apparently irrational and 
naive beliefs, you may have come to acknowledge that at least some individuals 
can exploit profound forms of ‘transpersonal’ optimism as highly effective means 
to cope with, and possibly even overcome, concrete hardships and emotional 
problems. And from conversations with various therapists I’m practically cer-
tain that there are cases where a client’s fear of being considered ‘not normal’ 
or mentally ill simply by virtue of having such experiences constitute a major 
obstacle to therapeutic progress. After all, most of us were brought up in the 
belief that science has conclusively shown that these things are impossible, and 
that something must be wrong with those reporting experiences that appear 
to suggest otherwise.
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Obviously, as a historian, I have no intention let alone competence to argue 
for the existence or non-existence of parapsychological (or ‘psi’) phenomena. It is 
merely as a potential token of assistance with such cases – however small it will 
be – the present article is written. In a sense, it could be viewed as complemen-
tary to recent clinical studies and revisions appearing to show that, whatever 
their ultimate nature, exceptional or ‘paranormal’ experiences are neither par-
ticularly uncommon nor intrinsically pathological (cf. cardeña, Lynn, & Krippner, 
2014). In fact, some of the recent historical research I shall try to distil in the 
following pages has revealed that the ‘occult’ was always a part of our scientific 
and intellectual heritage.
Science as a candle in the dark?
Unless you have had striking experiences of a seemingly occult nature yourself, 
you’re probably not likely to believe that ‘psi’ phenomena occur. But even if 
you do, you probably know that it is wise to keep that belief to yourself if you 
expect your peers to view you as sane, critical and scientifically minded. And 
supposing you’re a sceptic, you demand that belief should depend on sound 
empirical evidence, because the more outlandish a proposition the stronger 
the evidence must be to support it. But there simply is no scientific evidence, 
because wouldn’t we all know if there was? For science, we have been brought 
up to believe, is intrinsically self-correcting and always on the lookout for anom-
alies that might bring about revolutionary scientific breakthroughs. moreover, 
the very essence of scientific practice securing its self-correcting nature are 
intellectual core virtues – impartial love of truth, open-mindedness paired 
with discerning rigour, courageous anti-dogmatism and other qualities with-
out which the scientific enterprise would quickly lose its appeal as intrinsically 
progressive and good.
Those holding this quasi-teleological view of scientific progress are also likely 
to believe the study of the history of science and medicine is irrelevant: if science 
always provides the most reliable mirror of reality, its past can constitute little 
more than a graveyard of errors and obsolete ideas. For many, the only story 
worthwhile telling is in the style of that modern bible of popular science, carl 
Sagan’s The Demon-Haunted World: Science as Candle in the Dark (Sagan, 1995). 
In fact, subsequent celebrity scientists with a metaphysical axe to grind like 
Neil deGrasse Tyson and Bill Nye in the US, and Richard Dawkins and Brian cox 
here in Britain, have closely adhered to this standard way of preaching to the 
masses the gospel of science as a grand master narrative of humanity’s journey 
from the deplorable, oppressive superstitions of the past towards the inherently 
liberating and humanistic (Western) sciences of the present.
Science popularizers laudably hammer home the message that science 
deserves that name only if it is firmly rooted in the intellectual virtues mentioned 
above, and if it strictly builds on the best available evidence. curiously, however, 
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these basic principles – which obviously should guide historical research no 
less than science – are nearly always dropped as soon as the question of the 
relationship between science and religion (the supposed breeding ground of 
occult belief ) is concerned. Instead of systematic, impartial research, we find 
claims of their perennial incompatibility endlessly recycled in the mass media 
and the ‘public understanding of science’, while academic historical scholarship 
showing that the so-called conflict thesis of science and religion is largely a his-
toriographical artefact stemming from the nineteenth century is simply ignored.
In fact, the popular notion of the supposedly self-evident opposition of sci-
ence and religion – each routinely portrayed as monolithic entities epitomizing 
eternally progressive vs. regressive mindsets – turns out to be little more than 
a caricature, as soon as their interactions are reconstructed within original con-
texts and by paying attention to local, political, ideological and other factors 
usually passed over in triumphalist chronologies of progress (see, e.g. Brooke, 
1991; Dixon, cantor, & Pumfrey, 2010; Numbers, 2009).1 Like any other human 
endeavour, science is not practiced in a cultural, political and metaphysical 
vacuum, and it is these ‘extra-scientific’ conditions of the past that have pro-
foundly shaped scientific institutions, methods, research questions, and theo-
ries up the present. Recent studies in the history of neuroscience, for example, 
have revealed that contrary to present-day popular beliefs, epiphemonenalist 
standard views are no unequivocal corollary of neuroscientific advances. The 
view that the brain produces the mind has always been just one among various 
pre-existing metaphysical presuppositions, for which the modern mind and 
brain sciences have served as vehicles (hagner, 1992, 2012; harrington, 1987; 
Smith, 1992; Vidal, 2009; Weidman, 1999; Young, 1970).
A related myth is the view of the inherent opposition of scientific psychology 
and the occult. contrary to ongoing attempts to demarcate modern psychol-
ogy from parapsychology through simplistic historical assertions of the latter’s 
intrinsic unscientificity (e.g. Ash, Gundlach, & Sturm, 2010; marshall & Wendt, 
1980), a clear-cut distinction has been difficult if not impossible to draw in terms 
of research, methods and representatives. This is particularly true for the infancy 
of professionalized psychology: Between 1889 and about 1909, investigations 
into ‘marvellous’ phenomena associated with mesmerism and spiritualism 
were discussed on important platforms of early academic psychology like the 
International congresses of Psychology, which were initiated and organized 
by parapsychological researchers such as charles Richet, Julian Ochorowicz, 
Arthur T. and Frederic W. h. myers, henry and Eleanor m. Sidgwick, and Albert 
von Schrenck-Notzing. ‘Founding fathers’ of the psychological profession, such 
as William James in the US and Théodore Flournoy in Switzerland, were active 
psychical researchers and attempted an integration of radical empirical para-
psychological studies into fledgling psychology, while others, such as Théodule 
Ribot in France, appeared supportive of such attempts (Brower, 2010; Le maléfan 
& Sommer, 2015; Plas, 2012; Shamdasani, 1994; Sommer, 2013a, 2013b; Taylor, 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 C
am
br
idg
e] 
at 
03
:09
 22
 A
ug
us
t 2
01
7 
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PSYchOThERAPY AND cOUNSELLING  111
1985). Also flying in the face of assertions that scientific psychology had done 
away with the occult is the continuity of open-minded scientific interest in par-
apsychological phenomena within and beyond the psychological profession 
(mauskopf & mcVaugh, 1980; Sommer, 2013a, 2014b; Valentine, 2012).
Wills to believe
He who believes in it carries out experiments in sorcery, and he who does not believe in 
it as a rule does not. But since man is known to have a great tendency to find confirmed 
what he believes in, and to this end might even apply a great ingenuity to deceive 
himself, to me the success of such experiments only proves that those conducting 
them believe in them to begin with. (Wundt, 1892, pp. 9–10)2
The true opposites of belief, psychologically considered, are doubt and inquiry, not 
disbelief. (James, 1889, p. 322)
To say that the occult entanglements of modern psychology, and the sciences 
in general, have been squarely written out of public and disciplinary history is 
certainly not an overly melodramatic statement.3 Interestingly, an axiom under-
lying the traditional historiography of science and the occult that has been 
obscuringing these links boils down to a psychological rather than historical 
explanation of open-minded scientific interest in occult phenomena, and a 
surprisingly simplistic one at that: metaphysical bias and an infantile ‘need to 
believe’ in transcendental realities.
The above quote by Wilhelm Wundt, the ‘father’ of professionalized psy-
chology in Germany, shows that generalizing psychological explanations for 
scientific interest in ‘paranormal’ phenomena by an unhealthy obsession with 
the marvellous are not exactly new. In the US, Joseph Jastrow had launched 
his long career as self-appointed border-guard and popularizer of American 
psychology by proclaiming that open-minded scientific tests of the reported 
phenomena of spiritualism indicated a ‘state of mind that is to be prevented’ 
since it was ‘dangerous to mental sanity’ and ‘morbidly hungry for something 
unusual, something mystic, something occult’ (Jastrow, 1887, p. 8). A refusal to 
dismiss the occult was so dangerous for Jastrow and other opponents of psy-
chical research ‘because this system goes deeper, and appeals to the feelings, 
that it blinds its adherents to sense and reasoning’ (loc. cit.). much later, Edwin 
Boring, the eminent historian of experimental psychology, likewise insisted that 
it was ‘quite clear that interest in parapsychology has been maintained by faith. 
People want to believe in an occult something’ (Boring, 1966, p. xvi).
Unproblematic as such statements may seem at first glance, unfortunately the 
matter is not quite as straightforward. For once, we cannot simply assume that 
the remarkable outrage expressed by critics like Wundt, Jastrow and other hard-
liners in the fight against the ‘occult’ during the making of modern  psychology 
was scientifically justified. Again and again, writing in their function as scientists, 
these critics in fact mainly relied on appeals to assumed social, cultural and not 
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least religious dangers of a belief in ‘occult’ phenomena. Eschewing constructive 
dialogues with their targets of attack, opponents offered little dispassionate and 
constructive methodological critiques and favoured popular magazines and 
pamphlets rather than formal scholarly channels to get their polemics across. 
Epistemological positions, methods, aims and arguments of psychical research-
ers were misrepresented by reliance on generalized allegations of fraud and 
insinuations of methodological incompetence, the latter being tacitly explained 
through claims of metaphysical bias (Sommer, 2012, 2013a, chapter 4; Taylor, 
1996).
moreover, by the late nineteenth century, any empirical approach to marvel-
lous events had already been repudiated from intellectual discourse for over a 
century. Again contrary to widespread assumptions, however, it was predomi-
nantly political, philosophical and religious concerns rather than scientific work 
that had made fashionable the Enlightenment notion of belief in preternat-
ural occurrences as an indicator of intellectual, moral and spiritual vulgarity 
at best, and mental illness at worst (cf. cameron, 2010; Daston & Park, 1998; 
Porter, 1999; Sommer, 2013a, chapter 1). Later, popularizers of professional 
psychology merely continued an overwhelmingly polemical war, relying on 
an Enlightenment standard rhetoric using fuzzy but immensely loaded terms 
such as ‘mysticism’, ‘superstition’, ‘sorcery’, ‘enthusiasm’ and similar catchwords to 
discredit intellectual interest in alleged occult phenomena. This strategy served 
to construct a public image of the ‘new psychology’ particularly in the US and 
Germany as inherently progressive and unified, and not least as practically useful 
in the combat of the supposed social and cultural dangers of spiritualism and 
other ‘epidemic delusions’ (coon, 1992; Leary, 1987; Sommer, 2012).
Another stubborn myth regarding psychical research is that it has always 
been a reactionary movement, owing its existence to a childish reluctance 
to accept the self-evident truth of scientific materialism. While the history 
of scientific materialism itself thoroughly refutes the teleological standard 
narrative of materialism as a science-based and therefore obligatory world-
view (Gregory, 1977; Lange, 1876–1877), not a few leading representatives of 
psychical research like its doyens in France (charles Richet), Germany (Albert 
von Schrenck-Notzing), Poland (Julian Ochorowicz) and Italy (Enrico morselli 
and cesare Lombroso) have either been card-carrying materialists or positiv-
ists advocating a distinctively secular and anti-spiritualist psychical research 
(Brancaccio, 2014; Sommer, 2013a, chapter 2, 2014a). To complicate matters 
further, we would be hard pressed to identify a single representative of scien-
tific materialism among the early vocal psychological opponents of psychical 
research (cf. hatfield, 1995). Not least, a continued openness to extra-sensory 
perception (ESP) within a distinctively materialist tradition, Freudian psychoa-
nalysis (Devereux, 1974; Gyimesi, 2012; Totton, 2003), should make us sceptical 
of the psychical research vs. materialism stereotype. Yet, unchecked simplistic 
arguments from metaphysical bias that fail to stand up to historical scrutiny 
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continue to be advanced even in professional philosophical discussions of par-
apsychology and the demarcation problem (Sommer, 2014a).
To simplify an immensely complicated story: the professionalization and 
beginning secularization of the sciences in the late nineteenth century occurred 
in an atmosphere that was marked by a vehement hostility not so much to 
religion but to ‘magical thinking’. Scientific secularization and the rise of posi-
tivism were driven not by a materialist worldview, but mainly by rationalist and 
predominantly anti-clerical religious thinkers, who more often than not were 
just as programmatically opposed to materialism as they were to spiritualism 
and related large-scale occult movements of the time.
The opposition to magical thinking also crystallized in rather dramatic 
political events. The birth of modern experimental psychology in Germany, for 
example, occurred at the end of Bismarck’s Kulturkampf. This was a national war 
against the catholic church fought throughout the 1870s, which, after the march 
Revolution in 1848, could be called the German version of the French Revolution. 
Propagating an Enlightenment-style anti-‘superstition’ rhetoric, the Kulturkampf 
was vocally supported by leading popularizers of secularized science such as 
the outspoken anti-materialist Rudolf Virchow and the materialist Ernst haeckel, 
who were both strictly unsympathetic to a radical empirical approach to the 
phenomena of spiritualism and mesmerism. The crucial thing to understand 
here is that opposition to investigations of the phenomena of mesmerism and 
spiritualism came from multiple and often mutually antagonistic camps. To say 
this was a climate not exactly conducive to parapsychological experimentation 
would therefore be an understatement.
When viewed in its original context, the aggressive opposition by early psy-
chologists such as Wundt and Jastrow to unorthodox scientific activities appears 
to make sense in terms of a strategic imperative to protect the public image of 
nascent psychology from dangerous associations with the occult. The strange 
story of the coinage of the term ‘Parapsychologie’ by max Dessoir also lends itself 
to an interpretation along these lines. Following attacks by Wundt and other 
leaders of the new psychological profession, Dessoir, a young psychologist who 
had initially tried to expand the methodological scope of German psychological 
experimentation in the late 1880s through an integration of parapsychological 
research, promptly embarked on a much safer career as a self-appointed guard-
ian of rationality and Volksaufklärer (Sommer, 2013b).
But does political calculus and career opportunism really suffice to account 
for the ongoing bias in the public historiography of science and the occult? 
Although instances of violent opposition to new ideas is a commonplace in 
the history even of orthodox sciences, I cannot help but being struck by the 
persistent vehemence, the often hateful and emotional nature of some of 
the attacks that continue to inform this historiography.4 I find myself essen-
tially in agreement with psychoanalyst William Gillespie and many others, 
who observed that there was a strong tendency among critics to respond to 
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the data of psychical research ‘in an irrational, emotionally determined way’ 
(Gillespie, 1956, p. 209). In fact, while sweepingly accusing elite psychical 
researchers of a regressive and undisciplined ‘will to believe’, critics have at 
the same time displayed strong indications of various fears. The American 
neurologist George m. Beard, for example, was not exactly a model of a 
rational and calm response to spiritualism and its impartial investigation, 
when he recommended that for ‘logical, well-trained, truth-loving minds, the 
only security against spiritism is in hiding or running away’ (Beard, 1879, p. 
73). When Wundt was challenged to justify his dismissal of the experimental 
evidence presented by eminent German physicists in support of the reality 
of some of the phenomena of spiritualism, his fears of a downfall of modern 
culture and religion following in the train of a radical empiricism apparently 
got the better of his scientific curiosity, for he proclaimed:
The moral barbarism produced in its time by the belief in witchcraft would have 
been precisely the same, if there had been real witches. We can therefore leave the 
question entirely alone, whether or not you have ground to believe in the spiritualistic 
phenomena. (Wundt, 1879, p. 592, my italics)
In France, the physicist Léon Foucault opposed investigations of table moving 
by exclaiming:
If I saw a straw moved by the action of my will … I should be terrified. If the influ-
ence of mind upon matter does not cease at the surface of the skin, there is no 
safety left in the world for anyone (quoted in Sudre, 1960, p. 33).
Now I don’t want to appear as trying to substitute one crude psychological 
explanation (‘interest in occult phenomena has been motivated by an irrational 
need to believe’, etc.) with another, equally simplistic one (‘opposition to psy-
chical research has been motivated by irrational fears’) and use it as a histori-
ographical argument. At the same time, once we acknowledge that cultural 
and personal biases constitute fundamental problems in any realm of human 
activity, the insight that we have to deal with them somehow seems inescapable. 
In the philosophy of science, the problem of incommensurability as formu-
lated by writers like Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend already boils down to 
a squarely psychological one. Kuhn’s own thoughts on instances of dogmatism 
throughout the history of science, for example, cautiously drew on psycholog-
ical experiments in cognitive dissonance (Kuhn, 1996, esp. pp. 63–65, 112–115 
and chapter 10). Kuhn’s ideas were also informed by the notion of ‘absolute 
presuppositions’ as discussed by the philosopher Robin collingwood (1948). In 
the Kuhnian sense, these are fundamental propositions which scientists cannot 
afford to question or investigate but simply have to take for granted, such as 
the concept of causality, and the very possibility to get at fundamental truth 
in the first place.
This of course is the rationalist’s arch dilemma, which we also find at the 
heart of the pragmatist conception of truth. After stating that some of our most 
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fundamental knowledge comes second hand and from unquestioned author-
ities, William James observed:
Our belief in truth itself, for instance, that there is a truth, and that our minds and 
it are made for each other, – what is it but a passionate affirmation of desire, in 
which our social system backs us up? (James, 1897, p. 9).
For James, a radical empirical psychology of belief was forced to acknowledge 
the tautological or self-confirming nature and foundation of much supposedly 
rational belief. In the final analysis, it was passion rather than reason that James 
found decided metaphysical positions and their rationalizations: Like anybody 
else, the philosopher consciously or unconsciously wants to be the world a 
certain way. It was his inevitable will to believe that
loads the evidence for him one way or the other, making for a more sentimental or 
a more hard-hearted view of the universe, just as this fact or that principle would. 
he trusts his temperament. Wanting a universe that suits it, he believes in any rep-
resentation of the universe that does suit it (James, 1907, p. 7, original emphasis).
With James I should concede that a compartmentalization of mentalities into 
‘tough-minded’ or rational vs. ‘tender-minded’ or sentimental ways of being 
in the world (or, as I would like to suggest adding, ‘Platonic’ vs. ‘Epicurean’) is 
‘indeed monstrously over-simplified and rude’ (James, 1907, p. 35). But if we 
grant a near infinite variability of mixtures existing between these tempera-
mental poles, it might serve some analytical purpose after all – particularly, if we 
are to get at possible reasons for the immense public appeal of the indefinitely 
more monstrously crude stereotypes regarding science, religion and the occult.
Indeed, James’ reflections on the inevitably irrational origins of belief may 
be as radical as Léon Foucault’s above expression of horror in the face of a psy-
chokinetically moved straw is consequent. Superficially perceived, Foucault’s 
quote may have a paranoid or comical ring to it. But I think philosopher Stephen 
Braude has a point when he maintains that ‘it’s a very small step conceptu-
ally from psychokinetically nudging a matchstick to psychokinetically causing 
someone to drop dead, or causing a car to crash’ (Braude, 2007, p. 30).5 Such 
fears, according to Braude, might go a long way accounting for the often emo-
tional off-hand dismissal of empirical indications in support of psi phenomena. 
moreover, a psychoanalytic truism has it that most of us simply don’t want to 
know the innermost contents of our minds. If this is the case, how likely are we 
to welcome the prospect of others potentially having access? There might be 
good reasons why psi researchers have not only considered the fear of psi as a 
political problem, but also occasionally addressed it as a methodological issue 
(e.g. LeShan, 1966; Tart, 1984; Tart & LaBore, 1986).
Lastly, the ‘will to disbelieve’ in magical powers and correspondences may 
well be as old as the will to believe in them (cf. Whitmarsh, 2016). Philosopher 
michael Grosso (1990, pp. 244–246) reminds us that the ancient Greek materialist 
philosophers Epicurus and Lucretius have been revered like messiahs by their 
disciples for liberating them of the fear of evil magic, capricious gods and spirits, 
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and not least the horrifying uncertainty regarding the very nature of a hypo-
thetical afterlife. Epiphenomenalism has always been a radical and convenient 
way to shut out these deep-seated existential fears, and to hold with authors 
like Otto Rank and Ernest Becker that the human desire for immortality was 
universal faces various problems. For once, Grosso argues that anthropologically 
and historically considered, the fear of death appears to be a relatively recent 
scourge of humankind, and might in fact be a main characteristic of modernity. 
With the anthropology of Sir James Frazer, Grosso also makes the interesting 
claim that fear of the dead is a much more promising universal than the fear of 
annihilation.6
At least a conscious antipathy towards the notion of immortality seems in fact 
fairly common. This has been suggested by the results of a survey on attitudes 
to immortality conducted by James’ fellow pragmatist and psychical researcher, 
F.c.S. Schiller (1904). The philosopher Bernard Williams (Williams, 1976, chapter 
6) argued at length for the undesirability of immortality. c.D. Broad, who like 
James, Schiller and henri Bergson was one of several philosophically distin-
guished presidents of the Society for Psychical Research, famously concluded 
his assessment of the empirical indications for post-mortem survival by stating 
that he should be ‘slightly more annoyed than surprised’ to find himself surviving 
bodily death (Broad, 1962, p. 430).
A more general confession of a will to disbelieve was made by another emi-
nent philosopher, Thomas Nagel:
Even without God, the idea of a natural sympathy between the deepest truths of 
nature and the deepest layers of the human mind, which can be exploited to allow 
gradual development of a truer and truer conception of reality, makes us more at 
home in the universe than is secularly comfortable. The thought that the relation 
between mind and the world is something fundamental makes many people in 
this day and age nervous. I believe this is one manifestation of a fear of religion 
which has large and often pernicious consequences for modern intellectual life 
(Nagel, 1997, p. 130, original italics).7
Finally, hilary Putnam was comparatively vague when he stated that ‘‘Naturalism,’ 
I believe, is often driven by fear, fear that accepting conceptual pluralism will let 
in the ‘occult,’ the ‘supernatural’’ (Putnam, 2004, p. 66).
For what it’s worth, personally I find myself rather torn on the question 
whether magic and immortality are desirable. In my more introspective 
moments, I find Neoplatonic notions of a hidden interconnectedness of all 
living beings appealing, comforting and perhaps even conducive to mobiliz-
ing whatever little altruistic potential I might possess. On the other hand, the 
notion of other minds – incarnate as well as possibly discarnate – accidentally 
or intentionally snooping in the most intimate corners of my self, and having 
the power of manipulating and harming me through mere intentions, provokes 
a strong reaction of defence and unwillingness to grant the very possibility of 
transcendental correspondences. On a perhaps even more fundamental level, 
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a part of me undoubtedly craves the kinds of social, aesthetic and intellectual 
fulfilments that life occasionally has to offer to continue indefinitely. But there 
are also moments when the prospect of a hypothetical impotence to end my 
existence if I wished so fills me with a feeling nothing short of a claustrophobic 
panic episode.
Conclusion
The study of the ‘night side’ of nature may induce a sense of wonder, but it is 
also inevitably appended with a whole range of fundamental fears – in addition 
to the above, we could adduce the fear of being duped, of a loss of control, and 
not least the fear of ridicule. historian Peter Lamont (2013) has criticized the 
continued lumping together of all sorts of deviant beliefs in modern psycho-
logical scales supposing to measure ‘paranormal belief’. There has been a wide 
spectrum of reasons for unorthodox beliefs over time, which psychologists are 
yet wont to ignore and sweepingly explain in terms of cognitive biases. With 
the psychology of paranormal belief continuing to thrive as a professional spe-
ciality, Lamont further notes a marked asymmetry in the complete absence of a 
tradition studying the psychology of paranormal disbelief. A similar asymmetry 
characterizes the public use of history in the continuing war against ‘supersti-
tion’, ‘irrationality’ and ‘pseudoscience’.
Immanuel Kant famously stated that the essence of Enlightenment thought 
was the abolishment of dogmatism and false authorities, supplanted by the 
cultivation of courage to think for ourselves, his motto being sapere aude! – dare 
to know! Kant’s appeal to intellectual courage necessarily admits fear. To radi-
cally think independently and question all authority is a scary thing indeed. But 
Kant himself did not follow his own principles when he responded to reports of 
ghostly goings-on with ridicule and armchair pathologization (Kant, 1900), an 
attitude that characterized the age of Enlightenment as much as undoubted 
advances in the cultivation of tolerance in other matters. The complimentary 
bogeys that plagued Kant and many of his contemporaries – the fear of mate-
rialism on the one hand, and of ‘enthusiasm’ (i.e. irrationality and ‘superstition’) 
on the other – continued throughout the nineteenth century and guided the 
professionalization of modern sciences.
The quasi-apocalyptic fears of supposed global dangers of magical belief that 
were so typical of the nineteenth century have not borne out, and in the face 
of recent historical studies documenting the integral role of continued occult 
mentalities in the making of modernity (cf. Albanese, 2007; mannherz, 2012; 
Owen, 2004; Treitel, 2004), undiscriminating claims of a disenchantment of the 
world, let alone of the intrinsic backwardness and perilousness of occult beliefs, 
seem no longer feasible. But even though the original mentalities at work in the 
repudiation of radical empirical approaches to the occult may have vanished 
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from public awareness, academic curricula still rest on epistemic prescriptions 
informed by these anxieties.
I might do worse than conclude these initial and somewhat crude observa-
tions with an appeal made by William James over a century ago: ‘We all, scien-
tists and non-scientists, live on some inclined plane of credulity. The plane tips 
one way in one man, another way in another; and may he whose plane tips in 
no way be the first to cast a stone’ (James, 1897, p. 320). Some will no doubt 
misread this quote, along with my incomplete account of James’ pragmatist 
analysis of the psychology of belief above, as a call to a disastrous epistemic 
and scientific anarchism and relativism. But like James I prefer to say that a 
frank acknowledgement of the rationalist dilemma must not be confused with 
an excuse for lazy thinking and arrogant dogmatism. Far from paralysing our 
critical faculties, its admission might on the contrary motivate us to try harder 
than ever to identify, accept and eliminate inevitable biases standing in the way 
of our cultivating benevolent open-mindedness coupled with ‘never-sleeping 
suspicion of sources of error’ (James, 1897, p. 303).
Notes
1.  Some new age writers have also twisted the history of science to fit their own 
agendas. For a critique, see Brooke and cantor (1998, chapter 3).
2.  my translation.
3.  Regarding public history, see, for example, the hair-raisingly biased Wikipedia 
entries on parapsychology and psychical research.
4.  These have been documented en masse not only by unorthodox scientists but 
also by supposedly impartial historians and sociologists of science. For pertinent 
literature, see, for example, Sommer (2014a).
5.  Regarding popular beliefs in the efficacy of prayer and healing intentions, Braude 
also remarks that ‘No process can be used only for the good. So, if we open the 
door to the salutary (or simply benign) effects of our thoughts on the external 
world, we must also open it to the destructive influence of our thoughts’ (loc. cit.).
6.  While Grosso equates fears of the unknown with fears of the shadow in the 
Jungian sense, Jung himself resorted to anthropological arguments when he 
took issue with the ‘widespread bias’ against well-documented parapsychological 
phenomena, which to him revealed ‘all the symptoms of the primitive fear of 
ghosts’, for ‘even educated people who should know better occasionally utilize 
the most nonsensical arguments’, and may even ‘sign séance minutes and 
subsequently withdraw, as has been the case more than once, their signature, 
since what they had observed and verified was, as it were, impossible – as if one 
knew exactly what was possible!’ (moser, 1950, p. 11, my translation).
7.  On the question of theistic religion, Nagel continues: ‘I speak from experience, 
being strongly subject to this fear myself: I want atheism to be true and am 
made uneasy by the fact that some of the most intelligent and well-informed 
people believe in God and, naturally, hope that I’m right in my belief. It’s that I 
hope there is not God! I don’t want there to be a God; I don’t want the universe 
to be like that’ (loc. cit).
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